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Bounding the Impact of Unbounded Attacks in Stabilization∗
Swan Dubois† Toshimitsu Masuzawa‡ Se´bastien Tixeuil§
Abstract
Self-stabilization is a versatile approach to fault-tolerance since it permits a distributed system
to recover from any transient fault that arbitrarily corrupts the contents of all memories in the
system. Byzantine tolerance is an attractive feature of distributed systems that permits to cope with
arbitrary malicious behaviors. Combining these two properties proved difficult: it is impossible to
contain the spatial impact of Byzantine nodes in a self-stabilizing context for global tasks such as
tree orientation and tree construction.
We present and illustrate a new concept of Byzantine containment in stabilization. Our property,
called Strong Stabilization enables to contain the impact of Byzantine nodes if they actually perform
too many Byzantine actions. We derive impossibility results for strong stabilization and present
strongly stabilizing protocols for tree orientation and tree construction that are optimal with respect
to the number of Byzantine nodes that can be tolerated in a self-stabilizing context.
Keywords Byzantine fault, Distributed algorithm, Fault tolerance, Stabilization, Spanning tree con-
struction
1 Introduction
The advent of ubiquitous large-scale distributed systems advocates that tolerance to various kinds of
faults and hazards must be included from the very early design of such systems. Self-stabilization [4, 6, 15]
is a versatile technique that permits forward recovery from any kind of transient faults, while Byzantine
Fault-tolerance [10] is traditionally used to mask the effect of a limited number of malicious faults.
Making distributed systems tolerant to both transient and malicious faults is appealing yet proved
difficult [7, 3, 13] as impossibility results are expected in many cases.
Two main paths have been followed to study the impact of Byzantine faults in the context of self-
stabilization:
1. Byzantine fault masking. In completely connected synchronous systems, one of the most studied
problems in the context of self-stabilization with Byzantine faults is that of clock synchronization.
In [1, 7], probabilistic self-stabilizing protocols were proposed for up to one third of Byzantine
processors, while in [5, 9] deterministic solutions tolerate up to one fourth and one third of Byzantine
processors, respectively.
2. Byzantine containment. For local tasks (i.e. tasks whose correctness can be checked locally, such
as vertex coloring, link coloring, or dining philosophers), the notion of strict stabilization was
proposed [13, 14, 12]. Strict stabilization guarantees that there exists a containment radius outside
which the effect of permanent faults is masked. In [13], the authors show that this Byzantine
containment scheme is possible only for local tasks. As many problems are not local, it turns out
that it is impossible to provide strict stabilization for those.
∗A preliminary version of this work appears in the proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Stabilization,
Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems (SSS’06), see [11].
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Our Contribution In this paper, we investigate the possibility of Byzantine containment in a self-
stabilizing setting for tasks that are global (i.e. for with there exists a causality chain of size r, where r
depends on n the size of the network), and focus on two global problems, namely tree orientation and
tree construction. As strict stabilization is impossible with such global tasks, we weaken the contain-
ment constraint by limiting the number of times that correct processes can be disturbed by Byzantine
ones. Recall that strict stabilization requires that processes beyond the containment radius eventually
achieve their desired behavior and are never disturbed by Byzantine processes afterwards. We relax this
requirement in the following sense: we allow these correct processes beyond the containment radius to
be disturbed by Byzantine processes, but only a limited number of times, even if Byzantine nodes take
an infinite number of actions.
The main contribution of this paper is to present new possibility results for containing the influence of
unbounded Byzantine behaviors. In more details, we define the notion of strong stabilization as the novel
form of the containment and introduce disruption times to quantify the quality of the containment. The
notion of strong stabilization is weaker than the strict stabilization but is stronger than the classical notion
of self-stabilization (i.e. every strongly stabilizing protocol is self-stabilizing, but not necessarily strictly
stabilizing). While strict stabilization aims at tolerating an unbounded number of Byzantine processes,
we explicitly refer the number of Byzantine processes to be tolerated. A self-stabilizing protocol is (t, c, f)-
strongly stabilizing if the subsystem consisting of processes more than c hops away from any Byzantine
process is disturbed at most t times in a distributed system with at most f Byzantine processes. Here c
denotes the containment radius and t denotes the disruption time.
To demonstrate the possibility and effectiveness of our notion of strong stabilization, we consider tree
construction and tree orientation. It is shown in [13] that there exists no strictly stabilizing protocol with
a constant containment radius for these problems. The impossibility result can be extended even when the
number of Byzantine processes is upper bounded (by one). In this paper, we provide a (f∆d, 0, f)-strongly
stabilizing protocol for rooted tree construction, provided that correct processes remain connected, where
n (respectively f) is the number of processes (respectively Byzantine processes) and d is the diameter
of the subsystem consisting of all correct processes. The containment radius of 0 is obviously optimal.
We show that the problem of tree orientation has no constant bound for the containment radius in a
tree with two Byzantine processes even when we allow processes beyond the containment radius to be
disturbed a finite number of times. Then we consider the case of a single Byzantine process and present
a (∆, 0, 1)-strongly stabilizing protocol for tree orientation, where ∆ is the maximum degree of processes.
The containment radius of 0 is also optimal. Notice that each process does not need to know the number
f of Byzantine processes and that f can be n − 1 at the worst case. In other words, the algorithm is
adaptive in the sense that the disruption times depend on the actual number of Byzantine processes.
Both algorithms are also optimal with respect to the number of tolerated Byzantine nodes.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Distributed System
A distributed system S = (P,L) consists of a set P = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} of processes and a set L of
bidirectional communication links (simply called links). A link is an unordered pair of distinct processes.
A distributed system S can be regarded as a graph whose vertex set is P and whose link set is L, so we
use graph terminology to describe a distributed system S.
Processes u and v are called neighbors if (u, v) ∈ L. The set of neighbors of a process v is denoted
by Nv, and its cardinality (the degree of v) is denoted by ∆v(= |Nv|). The degree ∆ of a distributed
system S = (P,L) is defined as ∆ = max{∆v | v ∈ P}. We do not assume existence of a unique identifier
for each process (that is, the system is anonymous). Instead we assume each process can distinguish its
neighbors from each other by locally arranging them in some arbitrary order: the k-th neighbor of a
process v is denoted by Nv(k) (1 ≤ k ≤ ∆v).
Processes can communicate with their neighbors through link registers. For each pair of neighboring
processes u and v, there are two link registers ru,v and rv,u. Message transmission from u to v is
realized as follows: u writes a message to link register ru,v and then v reads it from ru,v. The link
register ru,v is called an output register of u and is called an input register of v. The set of all output
(respesctively input) registers of u is denoted by Outu (respectively Inu), i.e. Outu = {ru,v | v ∈ Nu}
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and Inu = {rv,u |v ∈ Nu}.
The variables that are maintained by processes denote process states. Similarly, the values of the
variables stored in each link register denote the state of the registers. A process may take actions during
the execution of the system. An action is simply a function that is executed in an atomic manner by
the process. The actions executed by each process is described by a finite set of guarded actions of the
form 〈guard〉 −→ 〈statement〉. Each guard of process u is a boolean expression involving the variables
of u and its input registers. Each statement of process u is an update of its state and its output/input
registers.
A global state of a distributed system is called a configuration and is specified by a product of states
of all processes and all link registers. We define C to be the set of all possible configurations of a
distributed system S. For a process set R ⊆ P and two configurations ρ and ρ′, we denote ρ
R
7→ ρ′
when ρ changes to ρ′ by executing an action of each process in R simultaneously. Notice that ρ and
ρ′ can be different only in the states of processes in R and the states of their output registers. For
completeness of execution semantics, we should clarify the configuration resulting from simultaneous
actions of neighboring processes. The action of a process depends only on its state at ρ and the states
of its input registers at ρ, and the result of the action reflects on the states of the process and its output
registers at ρ′.
A schedule of a distributed system is an infinite sequence of process sets. Let Q = R1, R2, . . . be a
schedule, where Ri ⊆ P holds for each i (i ≥ 1). An infinite sequence of configurations e = ρ0, ρ1, . . .
is called an execution from an initial configuration ρ0 by a schedule Q, if e satisfies ρi−1
Ri
7→ ρi for
each i (i ≥ 1). Process actions are executed atomically, and we also assume that a distributed daemon
schedules the actions of processes, i.e. any subset of processes can simultaneously execute their actions.
The set of all possible executions from ρ0 ∈ C is denoted by Eρ0 . The set of all possible executions
is denoted by E, that is, E =
⋃
ρ∈C Eρ. We consider asynchronous distributed systems where we can
make no assumption on schedules except that any schedule is weakly fair : every process is contained in
infinite number of subsets appearing in any schedule.
In this paper, we consider (permanent) Byzantine faults : a Byzantine process (i.e. a Byzantine-faulty
process) can make arbitrary behavior independently from its actions. If v is a Byzantine process, v can
repeatedly change its variables and its out put registers arbitrarily.
In asynchronous distributed systems, time is usually measured by asynchronous rounds (simply called
rounds). Let e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . be an execution by a schedule Q = R
1, R2, . . .. The first round of e is defined
to be the minimum prefix of e, e′ = ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρk, such that
⋃k
i=1 R
i = P ′ where P ′ is the set of correct
processes of P . Round t (t ≥ 2) is defined recursively, by applying the above definition of the first round
to e′′ = ρk, ρk+1, . . .. Intuitively, every correct process has a chance to update its state in every round.
2.2 Self-Stabilizing Protocol Resilient to Byzantine Faults
Problems considered in this paper are so-called static problems, i.e. they require the system to find static
solutions. For example, the spanning-tree construction problem is a static problem, while the mutual
exclusion problem is not. Some static problems can be defined by a specification predicate (shortly,
specification), spec(v), for each process v: a configuration is a desired one (with a solution) if every
process satisfies spec(v). A specification spec(v) is a boolean expression on variables of Pv (⊆ P ) where
Pv is the set of processes whose variables appear in spec(v). The variables appearing in the specification
are called output variables (shortly, O-variables). In what follows, we consider a static problem defined
by specification spec(v).
A self-stabilizing protocol is a protocol that eventually reaches a legitimate configuration, where
spec(v) holds at every process v, regardless of the initial configuration. Once it reaches a legitimate
configuration, every process v never changes its O-variables and always satisfies spec(v). From this def-
inition, a self-stabilizing protocol is expected to tolerate any number and any type of transient faults
since it can eventually recover from any configuration affected by the transient faults. However, the
recovery from any configuration is guaranteed only when every process correctly executes its action from
the configuration, i.e., we do not consider existence of permanently faulty processes.
When (permanent) Byzantine processes exist, Byzantine processes may not satisfy spec(v). In ad-
dition, correct processes near the Byzantine processes can be influenced and may be unable to satisfy
spec(v). Nesterenko and Arora [13] define a strictly stabilizing protocol as a self-stabilizing protocol
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resilient to unbounded number of Byzantine processes.
Given an integer c, a c-correct process is a process defined as follows.
Definition 1 (c-correct process) A process is c-correct if it is correct ( i.e. not Byzantine) and located
at distance more than c from any Byzantine process.
Definition 2 ((c, f)-containment) A configuration ρ is (c, f)-contained for specification spec if, given
at most f Byzantine processes, in any execution starting from ρ, every c-correct process v always satisfies
spec(v) and never changes its O-variables.
The parameter c of Definition 2 refers to the containment radius defined in [13]. The parameter
f refers explicitly to the number of Byzantine processes, while [13] dealt with unbounded number of
Byzantine faults (that is f ∈ {0 . . . n}).
Definition 3 ((c, f)-strict stabilization) A protocol is (c, f)-strictly stabilizing for specification spec
if, given at most f Byzantine processes, any execution e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . contains a configuration ρi that is
(c, f)-contained for spec.
An important limitation of the model of [13] is the notion of r-restrictive specifications. Intuitively,
a specification is r-restrictive if it prevents combinations of states that belong to two processes u and
v that are at least r hops away. An important consequence related to Byzantine tolerance is that the
containment radius of protocols solving those specifications is at least r. For some problems, such as the
spanning tree construction we consider in this paper, r can not be bounded to a constant. We can show
that there exists no (o(n), 1)-strictly stabilizing protocol for the spanning tree construction.
To circumvent the impossibility result, we define a weaker notion than the strict stabilization. Here,
the requirement to the containment radius is relaxed, i.e. there may exist processes outside the contain-
ment radius that invalidate the specification predicate, due to Byzantine actions. However, the impact
of Byzantine triggered action is limited in times: the set of Byzantine processes may only impact the
subsystem consisting of processes outside the containment radius a bounded number of times, even if
Byzantine processes execute an infinite number of actions.
From the states of c-correct processes, c-legitimate configurations and c-stable configurations are
defined as follows.
Definition 4 (c-legitimate configuration) A configuration ρ is c-legitimate for spec if every c-correct
process v satisfies spec(v).
Definition 5 (c-stable configuration) A configuration ρ is c-stable if every c-correct process never
changes the values of its O-variables as long as Byzantine processes make no action.
Roughly speaking, the aim of self-stabilization is to guarantee that a distributed system eventually
reaches a c-legitimate and c-stable configuration. However, a self-stabilizing system can be disturbed by
Byzantine processes after reaching a c-legitimate and c-stable configuration. The c-disruption represents
the period where c-correct processes are disturbed by Byzantine processes and is defined as follows
Definition 6 (c-disruption) A portion of execution e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρt (t > 1) is a c-disruption if and
only if the following holds:
1. e is finite,
2. e contains at least one action of a c-correct process for changing the value of an O-variable,
3. ρ0 is c-legitimate for spec and c-stable, and
4. ρt is the first configuration after ρ0 such that ρt is c-legitimate for spec and c-stable.
Now we can define a self-stabilizing protocol such that Byzantine processes may only impact the
subsystem consisting of processes outside the containment radius a bounded number of times, even if
Byzantine processes execute an infinite number of actions.
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Definition 7 ((t, k, c, f)-time contained configuration) A configuration ρ0 is (t, k, c, f)-time con-
tained for spec if given at most f Byzantine processes, the following properties are satisfied:
1. ρ0 is c-legitimate for spec and c-stable,
2. every execution starting from ρ0 contains a c-legitimate configuration for spec after which the values
of all the O-variables of c-correct processes remain unchanged (even when Byzantine processes make
actions repeatedly and forever),
3. every execution starting from ρ0 contains at most t c-disruptions, and
4. every execution starting from ρ0 contains at most k actions of changing the values of O-variables
for each c-correct process.
Definition 8 ((t, c, f)-strongly stabilizing protocol) A protocol A is (t, c, f)-strongly stabilizing if
and only if starting from any arbitrary configuration, every execution involving at most f Byzantine
processes contains a (t, k, c, f)-time contained configuration that is reached after at most l rounds. Pa-
rameters l and k are respectively the (t, c, f)-stabilization time and the (t, c, f)-process-disruption time of
A.
Note that a (t, k, c, f)-time contained configuration is a (c, f)-contained configuration when t = k = 0,
and thus, (t, k, c, f)-time contained configuration is a generalization (relaxation) of a (c, f)-contained
configuration. Thus, a strongly stabilizing protocol is weaker than a strictly stabilizing one (as processes
outside the containment radius may take incorrect actions due to Byzantine influence). However, a
strongly stabilizing protocol is stronger than a classical self-stabilizing one (that may never meet their
specification in the presence of Byzantine processes).
The parameters t, k and c are introduced to quantify the strength of fault containment, we do not
require each process to know the values of the parameters. Actually, the protocols proposed in this paper
assume no knowledge on the parameters.
There exists some relationship between these parameters as the following proposition states:
Proposition 1 If a configuration is (t, k, c, f)-time contained for spec, then t ≤ nk.
Proof Let ρ0 be a (t, k, c, f)-time contained configuration for spec. Assume that t > nk.
If there exists no execution e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . such that e contains at least nk + 1 c-disruptions, then
ρ0 is in fact a (nk, k, c, f)-time contained configuration for spec (and hence, we have t ≤ nk). This
is contradictory. So, there exists an execution e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . such that e contains at least nk + 1 c-
disruptions.
As any c-disruption contains at least one action of a c-correct process for changing the value of an
O-variable by definition, we obtain that e contains at least nk + 1 actions of c-correct processes for
changing the values of O-variables. There is at most n c-correct processes. So, there exists at least one
c-correct process which takes at least k + 1 actions for changing the value of O-variables in e. This is
contradictory with the fact that ρ0 is a (t, k, c, f)-time contained configuration for spec. 
2.3 Discussion
There exists an analogy between the respective powers of (c, f)-strict stabilization and (t, c, f)-strong
stabilization for the one hand, and self-stabilization and pseudo-stabilization for the other hand.
A pseudo-stabilizing protocol (defined in [2]) guarantees that every execution has a suffix that matches
the specification, but it could never reach a legitimate configuration from which any possible execution
matches the specification. In other words, a pseudo-stabilizing protocol can continue to behave satisfying
the specification, but with having possibility of invalidating the specification in future. A particular
schedule can prevent a pseudo-stabilizing protocol from reaching a legitimate configuration for arbitrarily
long time, but cannot prevent it from executing its desired behavior (that is, a behavior satisfying the
specification) for arbitrarily long time. Thus, a pseudo-stabilizing protocol is useful since desired behavior
is eventually reached.
Similarly, every execution of a (t, c, f)-strongly stabilizing protocol has a suffix such that every c-
correct process executes its desired behavior. But, for a (t, c, f)-strongly stabilizing protocol, there may
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Figure 1: A legitimate configuration for spanning tree construction (numbers denote the level of pro-
cesses). r is the (real) root and b is a Byzantine process which acts as a (fake) root.
exist executions such that the system never reach a configuration after which Byzantine processes never
have the ability to disturb the c-correct processes: all the c-correct processes can continue to execute their
desired behavior, but with having possibility that the system (resp. each process) could be disturbed
at most t (resp. k) times by Byzantine processes in future. A notable but subtle difference is that the
invalidation of the specification is caused only by the effect of Byzantine processes in a (t, c, f)-strongly
stabilizing protocol, while the invalidation can be caused by a scheduler in a pseudo-stabilizing protocol.
3 Strongly-Stabilizing Spanning Tree Construction
3.1 Problem Definition
In this section, we consider only distributed systems in which a given process r is distinguished as the
root of the tree.
For spanning tree construction, each process v has an O-variable prntv to designate a neighbor as
its parent. Since processes have no identifiers, prntv actually stores k (∈ {1, 2, . . . , ∆v}) to designate
its k-th neighbor as its parent. No neighbor is designated as the parent of v when prntv = 0 holds.
For simplicity, we use prntv = k (∈ {1, 2, . . . , ∆v}) and prntv = u (where u is the k-th neighbor of
v ∈ Nv(k)) interchangeably, and prntv = 0 and prntv = ⊥ interchangeably.
The goal of spanning tree construction is to set prntv of every process v to form a rooted spanning
tree, where prntr = 0 should hold for the root process r.
We consider Byzantine processes that can behave arbitrarily. The faulty processes can behave as if
they were any internal processes of the spanning tree, or even as if they were the root processes. The
first restriction we make on Byzantine processes is that we assume the root process r can start from an
arbitrary state, but behaves correctly according to a protocol. Another restriction on Byzantine processes
is that we assume that all the correct processes form a connected subsystem; Byzantine processes never
partition the system.
It is impossible, for example, to distinguish the (real) root r from the faulty processes behaving as
the root, we have to allow that a spanning forest (consisting of multiple trees) is constructed, where each
tree is rooted with a root, correct or faulty one.
We define the specification predicate spec(v) of the tree construction as follows.
spec(v) :
{
(prntv = 0) ∧ (levelv = 0) if v is the root r
(prntv ∈ {1, . . . , ∆v}) ∧ ((levelv = levelprntv + 1) ∨ (prntv is Byzantine)) otherwise
Notice that spec(v) requires that a spanning tree is constructed at any 0-legitimate configuration,
when no Byzantine process exists.
Figure 1 shows an example of 0-legitimate configuration with Byzantine processes. The arrow at-
tached to each process points the neighbor designated as its parent.
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3.2 Protocol ss-ST
In many self-stabilizing tree construction protocols (see the survey of [8]), each process checks locally the
consistence of its level variable with respect to the one of its neighbors. When it detects an inconsistency,
it changes its prnt variable in order to choose a “better” neighbor. The notion of “better” neighbor is
based on the global desired property on the tree (e.g. shortest path tree, minimun spanning tree...).
When the system may contain Byzantine processes, they may disturb their neighbors by providing
alternatively “better” and “worse” states. The key idea of protocol ss-ST to circumvent this kind of
perturbation is the following: when a correct process detects a local inconsistency, it does not choose a
“better” neighbor but it chooses another neighbor according to a round robin order (along the set of its
neighbor).
Figure 2 presents our strongly-stabilizing spanning tree construction protocol ss-ST that can tolerate
any number of Byzantine processes other than the root process (providing that the subset of correct
processes remains connected). These assumptions are necessary since a Byzantine root or a set of
Byzantine processes that disconnects the set of correct processes may disturb all the tree infinitely often.
Then, it is impossible to provide a (t, k, f)-strongly stabilizing protocol for any finite integer t.
The protocol is composed of three rules. Only the root can execute the first one (GA0). This rule sets
the root in a legitimate state if it is not the case. Non-root processes may execute the two other rules
(GA1 and GA2). The rule GA1 is executed when the state of a process is not legitimate. Its execution
leads the process to choose a new parent and to compute its local state in function of this new parent.
The last rule (GA2) is enabled when a process is in a legitimate state but there exists an inconsistence
between its variables and its shared registers. The execution of this rule leads the process to compute
the consistent values for all its shared registers.
3.3 Proof of Strong Stabilization of ss-ST
We cannot make any assumption on the initial values of register variables. But, we can observe that if an
output register of a correct process has inconsistent values with the process variables then this process
is enabled by a rule of ss-ST . By fairness assumption, any such process takes a step in a finite time.
Once a correct process v executes one of its action, variables of its output registers have values
consistent with the process variables: r-prntv,prntv = true, r-prntv,w = false (w ∈ Nv − {prntv}), and
r-levelv,w = levelv (w ∈ Nv) hold.
Consequently, we can assume in the following that all the variables of output registers of every correct
process have consistent values with the process variables.
We denote by LC the following set of configurations:
LC =
{
ρ ∈ C
∣∣∣(prntr = 0) ∧ (levelr = 0)∧(
∀v ∈ V − (B ∪ {r}), (prntv ∈ {1, . . . , ∆v}) ∧ (levelv = levelprntv + 1)
)}
We interest now on properties of configurations of LC.
Lemma 1 Any configuration of LC is 0-legitimate and 0-stable.
Proof Let ρ be a configuration of LC. By definition of spec, it is obvious that ρ is 0-legitimate.
Note that no correct process is enabled by ss-ST in ρ. Consequently, no actions of ss-ST can be
executed and we can deduce that ρ is 0-stable. 
We can observe that there exists some 0-legitimate configurations which not belong to LC (for example
the one of Figure 2).
Lemma 2 Given at most n− 1 Byzantine processes, for any initial configuration ρ0 and any execution
e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . starting from ρ0, there exists a configuration ρi such that ρi ∈ LC.
Proof First, note that if all the correct processes are disabled in a configuration ρ, then ρ belongs to LC.
Thus, it is sufficient to show that ss-ST eventually reaches a configuration ρi in any execution (starting
from any configuration) such that all the correct processes are disabled in ρi.
By contradiction, assume that there exists a correct process that is enabled infinitely often. Notice
that once the root process r is activated, r becomes and remains disabled forever. From the assumption
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constants of process v
∆v = the degree of v;
Nv = the set of neighbors of v;
variables of process v
prntv ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,∆v}: integer; // prntv = 0 if v has no parent,
// prntv = k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,∆v} if Nv[k] is the parent of v.
levelv: integer; // distance from the root.
variables in shared register rv,u
r-prntv,u: boolean; // r-prntv,u =true iff u is a parent of v.
r-levelv,u: integer; // the value of levelv
predicates
pred0 : prntv 6= 0 or levelv 6= 0 or ∃w ∈ Nv, [(r-prntv,w , r-levelv,w) 6= (false, 0)]
pred1 : prntv /∈ {1, 2, . . . , ∆v} or levelv 6= r-levelprntv,v + 1
pred2 : (r-prntv,prntv , r-levelv,prntv) 6= (true, levelv)
or ∃w ∈ Nv − {prntv}, [(r-prntv,w , r-levelv,w) 6= (false, levelv)]
atomic action of the root v = r // represented in form of guarded action
GA0:pred0 −→
prntv := 0;
levelv := 0;
for each w ∈ Nv do (r-prntv,w, r-levelv,w) := (false, 0);
atomic actions of v 6= r // represented in form of guarded actions
GA1:pred1 −→
prntv := nextv(prntv) where nextv(k) = (k mod ∆v) + 1;
levelv := r-levelprntv,v + 1;
(r-prntv,prntv , r-levelv,prntv) := (true, levelv);
for each w ∈ Nv − {prntv} do (r-prntv,w , r-levelv,w) := (false, levelv);
GA2:¬pred1 and pred2 −→
(r-prntv,prntv , r-levelv,prntv) := (true, levelv);
for each w ∈ Nv − {prntv} do (r-prntv,w , r-levelv,w) := (false, levelv);
Figure 2: Protocol ss-ST (actions of process v)
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that all the correct processes form a connected subsystem, there exists two neighboring correct processes
u and v such that u becomes and remains disabled and v is enabled infinitely often. Consider execution
after u becomes and remains disabled. Since the daemon is weakly fair, v executes its action infinitely
often. Then, eventually v designates u as its parent. It follows that v never becomes enabled again unless
u changes levelu. Since u never becomes enabled, this leads to the contradiction. 
Lemma 3 Any configuration in LC is a (f∆d,∆d, 0, f)-time contained configuration of the spanning
tree construction, where f is the number of Byzantine processes and d is the diameter of the subsystem
consisting of all the correct processes.
Proof Let ρ0 be a configuration of LC and e = ρ0, ρ1, . . . be an execution starting from ρ0. First, we
show that any 0-correct process takes at most ∆d actions in e, where d is the diameter of the subsystem
consisting of all the correct processes.
Let F be the set of Byzantine processes in e. Consider a subsystem S′ consisting of all the correct
processes: S′ = (P − F,L′) where L′ = {l ∈ L | l ∈ (P − F )× (P − F )}. We prove by induction on the
distance δ from the root in S′ that a correct process v δ hops away from r in S′ executes its action at
most ∆δ times in e.
• Induction basis (δ = 1):
Let v be any correct process neighboring to the root r. Since ρ0 is a legitimate configuration,
prntr = 0 and levelr = 0 hold at ρ0 and remain unchanged in e. Thus, if prntv = r and levelv = 1
hold in a configuration σ, then v never changes prntv or levelv in any execution starting from σ.
Since prntv = r and levelv = 1 hold within the first ∆v − 1 ≤ ∆ actions of v, v can execute its
action at most ∆ times.
• Induction step (with induction assumption):
Let v be any correct process δ hops away from the root r in S′, and u be a correct neighbor of v
that is δ − 1 hops away from r in S′ (this process exists by the assumption that the subgraph of
correct processes of S is connected). From the induction assumption, u can execute its action at
most ∆δ−1 times.
Assume that prntv = u and levelv = levelu+1 hold in a given configuration σ. We can observ that
v is not enabled until u does not modify its state. Then, the round-robin order used for pointers
modification allows us to deduce that v executes at most ∆v ≤ ∆ actions between two actions of u
(or before the first action of u). By the induction assumption, u executes its action at most ∆δ−1
times. Thus, v can execute its action at most ∆ +∆× (∆δ−1) = ∆δ times.
Consequently, any 0-correct process takes at most ∆d actions in e.
We say that a Byzantine process b deceive a correct neighbor v in the step ρ 7→ ρ′ if the state of b
makes the guard of an action of v true in ρ and if v executes this action in this step.
As a 0-disruption can be caused only by an action of a Byzantine process from a legitimate config-
uration, we can bound the number of 0-disruptions by counting the total number of times that correct
processes are deceived of neighboring Byzantine processes.
If a 0-correct v is deceived by a Byzantine neighbor b, it takes necessarily ∆v actions before being
deceiving again by b (recall that we use a round-robin policy for prntv). As any 0-correct process v
takes at most ∆d actions in e, v can be deceived by a given Byzantine neighbor at most ∆d−1 times.
A Byzantine process can have at most ∆ neighboring correct processes and thus can deceive correct
processes at most ∆ ×∆d−1 = ∆d times. We have at most f Byzantine processes, so the total number
of times that correct processes are deceived by neighboring Byzantine processes is f∆d.
Hence, the number of 0-disruption in e is bounded by f∆D. It remains to show that any 0-disruption
have a finite length to prove the result.
By contradiction, assume that there exists an infinite 0-disruption d = ρi, . . . in e. This implies that
for all j ≥ i, ρj is not in LC, which contradicts Lemma 2. Then, the result is proved. 
Theorem 1 (Strong-stabilization) Protocol ss-ST is a (f∆d, 0, f)-strong stabilizing protocol for the
spanning tree construction, where f is the number of Byzantine processes and d is the diameter of the
subsystem consisting of all the correct processes.
Proof From Lemmas 1 and 3, it is sufficient to show that ss-ST eventually reaches a configuration in
LC. Lemma 2 allows us to conclude. 
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3.4 Time Complexities
Proposition 2 The (f∆d, 0, f)-process-disruption time of ss-ST is ∆d where d is the diameter of the
subsystem consisting of all the correct processes.
Proof This result directly follows from Theorem 1 and Lemma 3. 
Proposition 3 The (f∆d, 0, f)-stabilization time of ss-ST is O((n−f)∆d) rounds where f is the number
of Byzantine processes and d is the diameter of the subsystem consisting of all the correct processes.
Proof By the construction of the algorithm, any correct process v which has a correct neighbor u takes
at most ∆ steps between two actions of u.
Given two processes u and v, we denote by d′(u, v) the distance between u and v in the subgraph of
correct processes of S. We are going to prove the following property by induction on i > 0:
(Pi): any correct process v such that d
′(v, r) = i takes at most 2 ·
i∑
j=1
∆j steps in any execution
starting from any configuration.
• Induction basis (i = 1):
Let v be a correct neighbor of the root r. By the algorithm, we know that the root r takes at most
one step (because r is correct). By the previous remark, we know that v takes at most ∆ steps
before and after the action of r. Consequently, v takes at most 2∆ steps in any execution starting
from any configuration.
• Induction step (i > 1 with induction assumption):
Let v be a correct process such that d′(v, r) = i. Denote by u one neighbor of v such that
d′(u, r) = i− 1 (this process exists by the assumption that the subgraph of correct processes of S
is connected).
By the previous remark, we know that v takes at most ∆ steps before the first action of u, between
two actions of u and after the last action of u. By induction assumption, we know that u takes at
most 2 ·
i−1∑
j=1
∆j steps. Consequently, v takes at most A actions where:
A = ∆+

2 · i−1∑
j=1
∆j

 ·∆+∆ = 2 · i∑
j=1
∆j
Since there is (n− f) correct processes and any correct process satisfies d′(v, r) < d, we can deduce that
the system reach a legitimate configuration in at most O((n− f)∆d) steps of correct processes.
As a round counts at least one step of a correct process, we obtain the result. 
4 Strongly-Stabilizing Tree Orientation
4.1 Problem Definition
In this section, we consider only tree systems, i.e. distributed systems containing no cycles. We assume
that all processes in a tree system are identical and thus no process is distinguished as a root.
Informally, tree orientation consists in transforming a tree system (with no root) into a rooted tree
system. Each process v has an O-variable prntv to designate a neighbor as its parent. Since processes
have no identifiers, prntv actually stores k (∈ {1, 2, . . . , ∆v}) to designate its k-th neighbor as its parent.
But for simplicity, we use prntv = k and prntv = u (where u is the k-th neighbor of v) interchangeably.
The goal of tree orientation is to set prntv of every process v to form a rooted tree. However, it is
impossible to choose a single process as the root because of impossibility of symmetry breaking. Thus,
instead of a single root process, a single root link is determined as the root: link (u, v) is the root link
when processes u and v designate each other as their parents (Fig. 3(a)). From any process w, the root
link can be reached by following the neighbors designated by the variables prnt.
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Figure 3: Tree orientation
When a tree system S has a Byzantine process (say w), w can prevent communication between
subtrees of S − {w}1. Thus, we have to allow each of the subtrees to form a rooted tree independently.
We define the specification predicate spec(v) of the tree orientation as follows.
spec(v) : ∀u (∈ Nv)[(prntv = u) ∨ (prntu = v) ∨ (u is Byzantine faulty)].
Note that the tree topology, the specification and the uniquiness of prntv (for any process v) imply
that, for any 0-legitimate configuration, there is at most one root link in any connected component of
correct processes. Hence, in a fault-free system, there exists exactly one root link in any 0-legitimate
configuration.
Figure 3 shows examples of 0-legitimate configurations (a) with no Byzantine process and (b) with
a single Byzantine process w. The arrow attached to each process points the neighbor designated as
its parent. Notice that, from Fig. 3(b), subtrees consisting of correct processes are classified into two
categories: one is the case of forming a rooted tree with a root link in the subtree (T1 in Fig. 3(b)), and
the other is the case of forming a rooted tree with a root process, where the root process is a neighbor
of a Byzantine process and designates the Byzantine process as its parent (T2 in Fig. 3(b)).
4.2 Impossibility for Two Byzantine Processes
Tree orientation seems to be a very simple task. Actually, for tree orientation in fault-free systems, we
can design a self-stabilizing protocol that chooses a link incident to a center process2 as the root link: in
case that the system has a single center, the center can choose a link incident to it, and in case that the
system has two neighboring centers, the link between the centers become the root link. However, tree
orientation becomes impossible if we have Byzantine processes. By the impossibility results of [13], we
can show that tree orientation has no (o(n), 1)-strictly stabilizing protocol; i.e. the Byzantine influence
cannot be contained in the sense of “strict stabilization”, even if only a single Byzantine process is
allowed.
An interesting question is whether the Byzantine influence can be contained in a weaker sense of
“strong stabilization”. The following theorem gives a negative answer to the question: if we have two
Byzantine processes, bounding the number of disruptions is impossible. We prove the impossibility for
more restricted schedules, called the central daemon, which disallows two or more processes to make
actions at the same time. Notice that impossibility results under the central daemon are stronger than
those under the distributed daemon in the sense that impossibility results under the central daemon also
hold for the distributed daemon.
Theorem 2 Even under the central daemon, there exists no deterministic (t, o(n), 2)-strongly stabilizing
protocol for tree orientation where t is any (finite) integer and n is the number of processes.
1For a process subset P ′ (⊆ P ), S − P ′ denotes a distributed system obtained by removing processes in P ′ and their
incident links.
2A process v is a center when v has the minimum eccentricity where eccentricity is the largest distance to a leaf. It is
known that a tree has a single center or two neighboring centers.
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Proof Let S = (P,L) be a chain (which is a special case of a tree system) of n processes: P =
{v1, v2, . . . , vn} and L = {(vi, vi+1) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1}.
For purpose of contradiction, assume that there exists a (t, o(n), 2)-strongly stabilizing protocol A
for some integer t. In the following, we show, for S with Byzantine processes v1 and vn, that A has an
execution e containing an infinite number of o(n)-disruptions. This contradicts the assumption that A
is a (t, o(n), 2)-strongly stabilizing protocol.
In S with Byzantine processes v1 and vn, A eventually reaches a configuration ρ1 that is o(n)-
legitimate for spec and o(n)-stable by definition of a (t, o(n), 2)-strongly stabilizing protocol. This exe-
cution to ρ1 constitutes the prefix of e.
To construct e after ρ1, consider another chain S
′ = (P ′, L′) of 3n processes and an execution of A
on S′, where let P ′ = {u1, u2, . . . , u3n} and L
′ = {(ui, ui+1) | 1 ≤ i ≤ 3n− 1}. We consider the initial
configuration ρ′1 of S
′ that is obtained by concatenating three copies (say S′1, S
′
2 and S
′
3) of S in ρ1 where
only the central copy S′2 is reversed right-and-left (Fig. 4). More formally, the state of wi and of w2n+i in
ρ′1 is the same as the one of vi in ρ1 for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Moreover, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the state of
wn+i in ρ
′
1 is the same as the one of vi in ρ1 with the following modification: if prntvi = vi−1 (respectively
prntvi = vi+1) in ρ1, then prntwn+i = wn+i+1 (respectively prntwn+i = wn+i−1) in ρ
′
1. For example, if
w denotes a center process of S (i.e. w = v⌈n/2⌉), then w is copied to w
′
1 = u⌈n/2⌉, w
′
2 = u2n+1−⌈n/2⌉
and w′3 = u2n+⌈n/2⌉, but only prntw′2 designates the neighbor in the different direction from prntw′1 and
prntw′
3
. From the configuration ρ′1, protocol A eventually reaches a legitimate configuration ρ
′′
1 of S
′
when S′ has no Byzantine process (since a strongly stabilizimg protocol is self-stabilizig in a fault-free
system). In the execution from ρ′1 to ρ
′′
1 , at least one prnt variable of w
′
1, w
′
2 and w
′
3 has to change
(otherwise, it is impossible to guarantee the uniquiness of the root link in ρ′′1). Assume w
′
i changes
prntw′
i
.
Now, we construct the execution e on S after ρ1. The main idea of this proof is to construct an
execution on S indistinguishable (for correct processes) from one of S′ because Byzantine processes of S
behave as correct processes of S′. Since v1 and vn are Byzantine processes in S, v1 and vn can simulate
behavior of the end processes of S′i (i.e. u(i−1)n+1 and uin). Thus, S can behave in the same way as
S′i does from ρ
′
1 to ρ
′′
1 . Recall that process w
′
1 modifies its pointer in the execution of S
′
i does from ρ
′
1
to ρ′′1 . Consequently, we can construct the execution that constitutes the second part of e, where prntw
changes at least once. Letting the resulting configuration be ρ2 (that coincides with the configuration
ρ′′i of S
′
i), ρ2 is clearly o(n)-legitimate for spec and o(n)-stable. Thus, the second part of e contains at
least one o(n)-disruption.
By repeating the argument, we can construct the execution e of A on S that contains an infinite
number of o(n)-disruptions. 
4.3 A Strongly Stabilizing Protocol for a Single Byzantine Process
4.3.1 Protocol ss-TO
In the previous subsection, we proved that there is no strongly stabilizing protocol for tree orientation if
two Byzantine processes exist. In this subsection, we consider the case with at most a single Byzantine
process, and present a (∆, 0, 1)-strongly stabilizing tree orientation protocol ss-TO. Note that we consider
the distributed daemon for this possibility result.
In a fault-free tree system, tree orientation can be easily achieved by finding a center process. A
simple strategy for finding the center process is that each process v informs each neighbor u of the
maximum distance to a leaf from u through v. The distances are found and become fixed from smaller
ones. When a tree system contains a single Byzantine process, however, this strategy cannot prevent
perturbation caused by wrong distances the Byzantine process provides: by reporting longer and shorter
distances than the correct one alternatively, the Byzantine process can repeatedly pull the chosen center
closer and push it farther.
The key idea of protocol ss-TO to circumvent the perturbation is to restrict the Byzantine influence
to one-sided effect: the Byzantine process can pull the chosen root link closer but cannot push it farther.
This can be achieved using a non-decreasing variable levelv as follows: when a process v finds a neighbor
u with a higher level, u chooses v as its parent and copies the level value from u. This allows the
Byzantine process (say z) to make its neighbors choose z as their parents by increasing its own level.
However, z can not make neighbor change their parents to other processes by decreasing its own level.
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(a) Construction of S’ from three copies of S and convergence of S’.
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(b) Execution of S where w changes its parent.
Figure 4: Construction of execution where w of S changes its parent infinitely often.
Thus, the effect the Byzantine process can make is one-sided.
Protocol ss-TO is presented in Fig. 5. For simplicity, we regard constantNv as denoting the neighbors
of v and regard variable prntv as storing a parent of v. Notice that they should be actually implemented
using the ordinal numbers of neighbors that v locally assigns.
The protocol is composed of three rules. The first one (GA1) is enabled when a process has a neighbor
which provides a strictly greater level. When the rule is executed, the process chooses this neighbor
as its parent and computes its new state in function of this neighbor. The rule GA2 is enabled when a
process v has a neighbor u (different from its current parent) with the same level such that v is not the
parent of u in the current oriented tree. Then, v chooses u as parent, increments its level by one and
refresh its shared registers. The last rule (GA3) is enabled for a process when there exists an inconsistence
between its variables and its shared registers. The execution of this rule leads the process to compute
the consistent values for all its shared registers.
4.3.2 Closure of Legitimate Configurations of ss-TO
We refine legitimate configurations of protocol ss-TO into several sets of configurations and show their
properties. We cannot make any assumption on the initial values of register variables. But once a correct
process v executes its action, variables of its output registers have values consistent with the process
variables: r-prntv,prntv = true, r-prntv,w = false (w ∈ Nv−{prntv}), and r-levelv,w = levelv (w ∈ Nv)
hold. In the following, we assume that all the variables of output registers of every correct process have
consistent values.
First we consider the fault-free case.
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constants of process v
∆v = the degree of v;
Nv = the set of neighbors of v;
variables of process v
prntv: a neighbor of v; // prntv = u if u is a parent of v.
levelv: integer;
variables in shared register rv,u
r-prntv,u: boolean; // r-prntv,u =true iff u is a parent of v.
r-levelv,u: integer; // the value of levelv
predicates
pred1 : ∃u ∈ Nv[r-levelu,v > levelv]
pred2 : ∃u ∈ Nv − {prntv}[(r-levelu,v = levelv) ∧ (r-prntu,v =false)]
pred3 : ((r-prntv,prntv , r-levelv,prntv) 6= (true, levelv))∨
(∃u ∈ Nv − {prntv}, (r-prntv,u, r-levelv,u) 6= (false, levelv))
atomic actions // represented in form of guarded actions
GA1:pred1 −→
Let u be a neighbor of v s.t. r-levelu,v = maxw∈Nv r-levelw,v;
prntv := u; levelv := r-levelu,v;
(r-prntv,u, r-levelv,u) := (true, levelv);
for each w ∈ Nv − {u} do (r-prntv,w, r-levelv,w) := (false, levelv);
GA2:¬pred1 ∧ pred2 −→
Let u be a neighbor of v s.t. (r-levelu,v = levelv) ∧ (r-prntu,v =false);
prntv := u; levelv := levelv + 1;
(r-prntv,u, r-levelv,u) := (true, levelv);
for each w ∈ Nv − {u} do (r-prntv,w, r-levelv,w) := (false, levelv);
GA3:¬pred1 ∧ ¬pred2 ∧ pred3 −→
(r-prntv,prntv , r-levelv,prntv) := (true, levelv);
for each w ∈ Nv − {prntv} do (r-prntv,w , r-levelv,w) := (false, levelv);
Figure 5: Protocol ss-TO (actions of process v)
Definition 9 (LC0) In a fault-free tree, we define the set of configurations LC0 as the set of configura-
tions such that: (a) spec(v) holds for every process v and (b) levelu = levelv holds for any processes u
and v.
In any configuration of LC0, variables prntv of all processes form a rooted tree with a root link as
Fig. 3(a), and all variables levelv have the same value.
Lemma 4 In a fault-free tree, once protocol ss-TO reaches a configuration ρ in LC0, it remains at ρ.
Proof Consider any configuration ρ in LC0. Since all variables levelv have the same value, the guard of
GA1 cannot be true in ρ. Since spec(v) holds at every process in ρ, there exist no neighboring processes
u and v such that prntu 6= v and prntv 6= u holds. It follows that the guard of GA2 cannot be true in
ρ. Once each process executes an action, all the variables of its output registers are consistent with its
local variables, and thus, the guard of GA3 cannot be true. 
For the case with a single Byzantine process, we define the following sets of configurations.
Definition 10 (LC1) Let z be the single Byzantine process in a tree system. A configuration is in the
set LC1 if every subtree (or a connected component) of S-{z} satisfies either the following (C1) or (C2).
(C1) (a) spec(u) holds for every correct process u, (b) prntv = z holds for the neighbor v of z, and (c)
levelw ≥ levelx holds for any neighboring correct processes w and x where w is nearer than x to z.
(C2) (d) spec(u) holds for every correct process u, and (e) levelv = levelw holds for any correct processes
v and w.
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Definition 11 (LC2) Let z be the single Byzantine process in a tree system. A configuration is in the
set LC2 if every subtree (or a connected component) of S-{z} satisfies the condition (C1) of Definition
10.
In any configuration of LC2, every subtree forms the rooted tree with the root process neighboring
the Byzantine process z. For configurations of LC2, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 5 Once protocol ss-TO reaches a configuration ρ of LC2, it remains in configurations of LC2
and, thus, no correct process u changes prntu afterward. That is, any configuration of LC2 is (0, 1)-
contained.
Proof Consider any execution e starting from a configuration ρ of LC2. In ρ, every subtree of S − {z}
forms the rooted tree with the root process neighboring the Byzantine process z. Note that, as long as
no correct process u changes prntu in e, action GA2 cannot be executed at any correct process. On the
other hand, if a process u executes action GA1 in e, levelprntu ≥ levelu necessarily holds immediately
this action. Consequently, if we assume that no correct process u changes prntu in e (by execution of
GA1) then every configuration of e is in LC2. To prove the lemma, it remains to show that e contains
no activation of GA1 by a correct process. In the following, we show that any correct process u never
changes prntu in e.
For contradiction, assume that a correct process u changes prntu first among all correct processes.
Notice that every correct process v can execute GA1 or GA3 but cannot change prntv before u changes
prntu. Also notice that u changes prntu to its neighbor (say w) by execution of GA1 and w is a correct
process. From the guard of GA1, levelw > levelu holds immediately before u changes prntu. On the
other hand, since w is a correct process, w never changes prntw before u. This implies that prntw = u
holds immediately before u changes prntu, and thus levelu ≥ levelw holds. This is a contradiction. 
Notice that a correct process u may change levelu by execution of GA1 even after a configuration of
LC2. For example, when the Byzantine process z increments levelz infinitely often, every process u may
also increment levelu infinitely often.
Lemma 6 Any configuration ρ in LC1 is (∆z , 1, 0, 1)-time contained where z is the Byzantine process.
Proof Let ρ be a configuration of LC1. Consider any execution e starting from ρ. By the same discussion
as the proof of Lemma 5, we can show that any subtree satisfying (C1) at ρ always keeps satisfying the
condition and no correct process u in the subtree changes prntu afterward.
Consider a subtree satisfying (C2) at ρ and let y be the neighbor of the Byzantine process z in the
subtree. From the fact that variables prntu form a rooted tree with a root link and all variables levelu
have the same value in the subtree at ρ, no process u in the subtree changes prntu or levelu unless y
executes prnty := z in e. When prnty := z is executed, levely becomes larger than levelu of any other
process u in the subtree. Since the value of variable levelu of each correct process u is non-decreasing,
every correct neighbor (say v) of y eventually executes prntv := y and levelv := levely (by GA1). By
repeating the argument, we can show that the subtree eventually reaches a configuration satisfying (C1)
in O(d′) rounds where d′ is the diameter of the subtree. It is clear that any configuration before reaching
the first configuration satisfying (C1) is not in LC1, and that each process u changes prntu at most once
during the execution.
Therefore, any execution e starting from ρ contains at most ∆z 0-disruptions where each correct
process u changes prntu at most once. 
4.3.3 Convergence of ss-TO
We first show convergence of protocol ss-TO to configurations of LC0 in a fault-free case.
Lemma 7 In a fault-free tree system, protocol ss-TO eventually reaches a configuration of LC0 from
any initial configuration.
Proof We prove the convergence to a configuration of LC0 by induction on the number of processes n.
It is clear that protocol ss-TO reaches a configuration of LC0 from any initial configuration in case of
n = 2.
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Now assume that protocol ss-TO reaches a configuration of LC0 from any initial configuration in case
that the number of processes is n− 1 (inductive hypothesis), and consider the case that the number of
processes is n.
Let u be any leaf process and v be its only neighbor and ρ be an arbitrary configuration. In a first
time, we show that any execution e starting from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration such that
levelv ≥ levelu holds. If this condition holds in ρ, we have the result. Otherwise (levelv < levelu),
u is continuously enabled by GA1 (until the condition is true). Hence, the condition becomes true (by
an activation of v) or this action is executed by u in a finite time. In both cases, we obtain that
levelv ≥ levelu holds in at most one round.
After that, process u can execute only guarded action GA1 or GA3 since prntu = v always holds.
Thus, after the first round completes, prntu = v and levelv ≥ levelu always hold (indeed, v can only
increase its level variable and level variable of u can only take greater values than v’s). It follows that
v never executes prntv := u in the second round and later. This implies that e reaches in a finite time
a configuration ρ′ such that (a) prntv 6= u always holds after ρ
′ , or (b) prntv = u always holds after ρ
′
(since v cannot execute prntv := u after ρ
′ if prntv 6= u).
In case (a), the behavior of v after ρ′ is never influenced by u: v behaves exactly the same even when
u does not exist. From the inductive hypothesis, protocol ss-TO eventually reaches a configuration ρ′′
such that S − {u} satisfies the condition of LC0 and remains in ρ
′′ afterward (from Lemma 4). After u
executes its action at ρ′′, levelu = levelv holds and thus the configuration of S is in LC0.
Now consider case (b), where we do not use the inductive hypothesis. The fact that prntv = u
(and prntu = v) always holds after ρ
′ implies that levelv (and also levelu) remains unchanged after ρ
′.
Assume now that a neighbor w (6= u) of v satisfies continuously levelw 6= levelv or prntw 6= v from a
configuration ρ′′ of e after ρ′. If w satisfies continuously levelw > levelv from ρ
′′, then v executes GA1 in
a finite time, this is a contradiction. If w satisfies continuously levelw < levelv from ρ
′′, then w executes
GA1 in a finite time and takes a level value such that levelw ≥ levelv, that contradicts the fact that w
satisfies continuously levelw < levelv from ρ
′′. This implies that levelw = levelv and prntw = v in a
finite time in any execution starting from ρ′. As v does not modify its state after ρ′, w is never enabled
after ρ′. This implies that the fragment of S consisting of processes within distance two from u reaches
a configuration satisfying the condition of LC0 and remains unchanged. We can now apply the same
reasoning by induction on the distance of any process to u and show that ss-TO eventually reaches a
configuration in LC0 where link (u, v) is the root link.
Consequently, protocol ss-TO reaches a configuration of LC0 from any initial configuration. 
Now, we consider the case with a single Byzantine process.
Lemma 8 In a tree system with a single Byzantine process, protocol ss-TO eventually reaches a config-
uration of LC1 from any initial configuration.
Proof Let z be the Byzantine process, S′ be any subtree (or a connected component) of S − {z} and y
be the process in S′ neighboring z (in S).
We prove, by induction on the number of processes n′ of S′, that S′ eventually reaches a configuration
satisfying the condition (C1) or (C2) of Definition 10.
It is clear that S′ reaches a configuration satisfying (C1) from any initial configuration in case of
n′ = 1.
Now assume that S′ reaches a configuration satisfying (C1) or (C2) from any initial configuration in
case of n′ = k − 1 (inductive hypothesis), and consider the case of n′ = k (≥ 2).
From n′ ≥ 2, there exists a leaf process u in S′ that is not neighboring the Byzantine process z. Let
v be the neighbor of u. Since processes u and v are correct processes, we can show the following by the
same argument as the fault-free case (Lemma 7): after some configuration ρ, (a) prntv 6= u always holds,
or (b) prntv = u always holds. In case (a), we can show from the inductive hypothesis that S
′ eventually
reaches a configuration satisfying (C1) or (C2). In case (b), we can show that S′ eventually reaches a
configuration satisfying (C2) where link (u, v) is the root link.
Consequently, protocol ss-TO reaches a configuration of LC1 from any initial configuration. 
The following main theorem is obtained from Lemmas 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.
Theorem 3 Protocol ss-TO is a (∆, 0, 1)-strongly stabilizing tree-orientation protocol.
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4.3.4 Round Complexity of ss-TO
In this subsection, we focus on the round complexity of ss-TO. First, we show the following lemma.
Lemma 9 Let v and u be any neighbors of S. Let S′ be the subtree of S −{v} containing u and h(v, u)
be the largest distance from v to a leaf process of S′. If S′∪{v} contains no Byzantine process, prntv := u
of GA1 or GA2 can be executed only in the first 2h(v, u) rounds. Moreover, in round 2h(v, u)+1 or later,
levelv remains unchanged as long as prntv = u holds.
Proof We prove the lemma by induction on h(v, u).
First consider the case of h(v, u) = 1, where u is a leaf process. When the first round completes,
all the output registers of every process becomes consistent with the process variables. Since u is a leaf
process, prntu = v always holds. It follows that process v can execute prntv := u only in GA1. Once v
executes its action in the second round, levelv ≥ levelu holds and prntv := u of GA1 cannot be executed
afterward (see proof of Lemma 7). Thus, prntv := u of GA1 can be executed only in the first and second
rounds. It is clear that in round 3 or later, levelv remains unchanged as long as prntv = u holds.
We assume that the lemma holds when h(v, u) ≤ k − 1 (inductive hypothesis) and consider the case
of h(v, u) = k. We assume that prntv := u of GA1 or GA2 is executed in round r, and show that r ≤ 2k
holds in the following. Variable levelv is also incremented in the action, and let ℓ be the resultant value
of levelv. In the following, we consider two cases.
• Case that prntv := u of GA1 is executed in round r: when prntv := u is executed, levelu = ℓ holds.
But levelu < ℓ holds when v executes its action in round r − 1; otherwise, v reaches a state with
levelv ≥ ℓ in round r−1 and cannot execute prntv := u (with levelv := ℓ) in round r. This implies
that u incremented levelu to ℓ in round r − 1 or r.
In the case that u makes the increment of levelu by GA1, u executes prntu := w for w (6= v)
in the same action. Since h(u,w) < h(v, u) holds, the action is executed in the first 2h(u,w)
rounds from the inductive hypothesis. Consequently, prntv := u of GA1 is executed in round
2h(u,w) + 1 (< 2h(v, u)) at latest.
In the case that u makes the increment of levelu by GA2, u executes prntu := w for some w (∈ Nu)
in the same action, where w = v may hold. For the case of w 6= v, we can show, by the similar
argument to the above, that prntv := u is executed in round 2h(u,w) + 1 (< 2h(v, u)) at latest.
Now consider the case of w = v. Then levelv = levelu = ℓ − 1, prntv 6= u and prntu 6= v hold
immediately before u executes prntu := v and levelu := ℓ. Between the actions of levelu := ℓ − 1
(with prntu := w (w 6= v)) and levelu := ℓ (with prntu := v), v can execute its action at most
once; otherwise, levelv ≥ ℓ − 1 holds after the first action, and levelv ≥ ℓ or prntv = u holds
after the second action. This implies that levelu := ℓ − 1 with prntu := w (w 6= v) is executed
in the previous or the same round as the action of levelu := ℓ, and thus, in round r − 2 or later.
Since h(u,w) < h(v, u) holds, the action is executed in the first 2h(u,w) rounds from the inductive
hypothesis. Consequently, prntv := u of GA1 is executed in round 2h(u,w) + 2 (≤ 2h(v, u)) at
latest.
• Case that prntv := u is executed in GA2: then levelv = levelu = ℓ−1, prntv 6= u and prntu 6= v hold
immediately before v executes prntv := u and levelv := ℓ. Between the executions of levelv := ℓ−1
and levelv := ℓ, u can execute its action at most once, and u executes prntu := w for some w (6= v)
in the action.Since h(u,w) < h(v, u) holds, this action is executed in the first 2h(u,w) rounds from
the inductive hypothesis. Consequently, prntv := u is executed in round 2h(u,w) + 1 (< 2h(v, u)).
It remains to show that levelv remains unchanged in round 2h(v, u)+1 or later, as long as prntv = u
holds. Now assume that prntv = u holds at the end of round 2h(v, u).
• Case that prntu = v holds at the end of round 2h(v, u): since h(u,w) < h(v, u) for any w ∈ Nu−{v},
prntu := w cannot be executed in round 2h(v, u) + 1 or later from the inductive hypothesis, and
so prntu = v holds afterward. Thus, it is clear that levelv remains unchanged as long as prntv = u
(and prntu = v) holds.
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• Case that prntu 6= v holds at the end of round 2h(v, u): let prntu = w hold for some w ∈ Nu−{v} at
the end of round 2h(v, u). Since h(u,w) < h(v, u), levelu remains unchanged as long as prntu = w
holds from the inductive hypothesis. It follows that levelv remains unchanged as long as prntv = u
and prntu = w hold. Since h(u, x) < h(v, u) for any x ∈ Nu − {v}, prntu := x cannot be executed
in round 2h(v, u) + 1 or later, but prntu := v can be executed. Immediately after execution of
prntu := v, levelv = levelu holds if prntv remains unchanged. Thus, it is clear that levelv remains
unchanged as long as prntv = u (and prntu = v) holds.

The following lemma holds for the fault-free case.
Lemma 10 In a fault-free tree system, protocol ss-TO reaches a configuration of LC0 from any initial
configuration in O(d) rounds where d is the diameter of the tree system S.
Proof Lemma 9 implies that, after round 2d+1 or later, no process v changes prntv or levelv and thus
the configuration remains unchanged. Lemma 7 guarantees that the final configuration is a configuration
in LC0. 
For the single-Byzantine case, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 11 In a tree system with a single Byzantine process, protocol ss-TO reaches a configuration of
LC1 from any initial configuration in O(n) rounds.
Proof Let z be the Byzantine process and S′ be any subtree of S − {z}. Let v be the neighbor of z in
S′. From Lemma 9, v cannot execute prntv := w for any w ∈ Nv − {z} in round 2d
′ + 1 or later, where
d′ is the diameter of S′. We consider the following two cases depending on prntv.
• Case 1: there exists w ∈ Nv − {z} such that prntv = w at the end of round 2d
′ and prntv remains
unchanged during the following d′ rounds (from round 2d′ + 1 to round 3d′).
From Lemma 9, levelv also remains unchanged during the d
′ rounds. By the similar discussion to
that in proof of Lemma 9, we can show that S′ reaches a configuration satisfying the condition
(C2) of Definition 10 by the end of round 3d′.
• Case 2: prntv = z at the end of round 2d
′ or there exists at least one configuration during the
following d′ rounds (from round 2d′ + 1 to round 3d′) such that prntv = z holds.
Let c be the configuration where prntv = z holds. From Lemma 9, prntv = z always holds after c.
We can show, by induction of k that, a fraction of S′ consisting of processes with distance up to k
from v satisfies the condition (C1) at the end of k rounds after c. Thus, S′ reaches a configuration
satisfying the condition (C1) of Definition 10 by the end of round 4d′.
After a subtree reaches a configuration satisfying the condition (C2), its configuration may change
into one satisfying the condition (C1) and the configuration may not satisfy (C1) or (C2) during the
transition. However, Lemma 6 guarantees that the length of the period during the subtree does not
satisfy (C1) or (C2) is O(d′) rounds, where d′ is the diameter of the subtree. Since the total of diameters
of all the subtrees in S − {z} is O(n), the convergence to a configuration of LC1 satisfying (C1) or (C2)
can be delayed at most O(n) rounds. 
Finally, we can show the following theorem.
Theorem 4 Protocol ss-TO is a (∆, 0, 1)-strongly stabilizing tree-orientation protocol. The protocol
reaches a configuration of LC0 ∪ LC1 from any initial configuration. The protocol may move from a
legitimate configuration to an illegitimate one because of the influence of the Byzantine process, but it can
stay in illegitimate configurations during the total of O(n) rounds (that are not necessarily consecutive)
in the whole execution.
Proof Theorem 3 shows that ss-TO is a (∆, 0, 1)-strongly stabilizing tree-orientation protocol. Lemma
10 and 11 guarantee that ss-TO reaches a configuration of LC0 ∪ LC1 from any initial configuration
within O(n) rounds. For the case with a single Byzantine process (say z), each subtree of S − {z} may
experience an illegitimate period (not satisfying the condition (C1) or (C2)) after such a configuration.
However, Lemma 6 guarantees that the length of the illegitimate period is O(d′) where d′ is the diameter
of the subtree. Since the total of diameters of all the subtrees in S −{z} is O(n), the total length of the
periods that does not satisfy (C1) or (C2) is O(n) rounds. 
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5 Concluding Remarks
We introduced the notion of strong stabilization, a property that permits self-stabilizing protocols to
contain Byzantine behaviors for tasks where strict stabilization is impossible. In strong stabilization,
only the first Byzantine actions that are performed by a Byzantine process may disturb the system. If
the Byzantine node does not execute Byzantine actions, but only correct actions, its existence remains
unnoticed by the correct processes. So, by behaving properly, the Byzantine node may have the system
disturbed arbitrarily far in the execution. By contrast, if the Byzantine node executes many Byzantine
actions at the beginning of the execution, there exists a time after which those Byzantine actions have
no impact on the system. As a result, the faster an attacker spends its Byzantine actions, the faster
the system become resilient to subsequent Byzantine actions. An interesting trade-off appears: the
more actually Byzantine actions are performed, the faster the stabilization of our protocols is (since the
number of steps performed by correct processes in response to Byzantine disruption is independent from
the number of Byzantine actions). Our work raises several important open questions:
1. is there a trade-off between the number of perturbations Byzantine nodes can cause and the contain-
ment radius ? In this paper, we strove to obtain optimal containment radius in strong stabilization,
but it is likely that some problems do not allow strong stabilization with containment radius 0. It
is then important to characterize the difference in containment radius when the task to be solved
is “harder” than tree orientation or tree construction.
2. is there a trade-off between the total number of perturbations Byzantine nodes can cause and the
number of Byzantine nodes, that is, is a single Byzantine node more effective to harm the system
than a team of Byzantine nodes, considering the same total number of Byzantine actions ? A first
step in this direction was recently taken by [16], where Byzantine actions are assumed to be upper
bounded, for the (global) problem of leader election. Their result hints that only Byzantine actions
are relevant, independently of the number of processes that perform them. It is thus interesting to
see if the result still holds in the case of potentially infinite number of Byzantine actions.
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